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ABSTRACT
Expectations about the future are central for determination of current
macroeconomic outcomes and the formulation of monetary policy. Recent
literature has explored ways for supplementing the benchmark of rational
expectations with explicit models of expectations formation that rely on
econometric learning. Some apparently natural policy rules turn out to imply
expectational instability of private agents’ learning. We use the standard New
Keynesian model to illustrate this problem and survey the key results about
interest-rate rules that deliver both uniqueness and stability of equilibrium
under econometric learning. We then consider some practical concerns such as
measurement errors in private expectations, observability of variables and
learning of structural parameters required for policy. We also discuss some
recent applications including policy design under perpetual learning, estimated
models with learning, recurrent hyperinflations, and macroeconomic policy to
combat liquidity traps and deflation.
Keywords: Imperfect knowledge, learning, interest-rate setting,
fluctuations, stability, determinacy.
JEL Classifications: E52, E31, D84.
1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy in terms of interest rate or other rules has
been extensively studied in recent research.1 This literature gives a central
role for forecasts of future inflation and output, and the question of whether
monetary policy should be forward-looking has been subject to discussion
and debate. Bank of England Inflation Reports, see Bank of England (2007),
and the June and December Issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the European
Central Bank, see European Central Bank (2007), present private sector
forecasts as well as internal macroeconomic projections. Empirical evidence
on Germany, Japan and the US since 1979 provided by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1998) suggests that central banks are forward-looking in practice.
The rational expectations (RE) hypothesis, the standard benchmark in
macroeconomics since the seminal work of Lucas (1976) and Sargent andWal-
lace (1975), has been employed in most of the research on monetary policy
and interest rate rules. The most common formulation of the RE hypothe-
sis is based on the assumption that the private agents and the policy-maker
know the “true model of the economy”, except for unforecastable random
shocks.2 The RE assumption is excessively strong: neither private agents
nor policy-makers have perfect knowledge of the economy. In reality, econo-
mists formulate and estimate models that are used to make macroeconomic
forecasts and carry out policy analysis. These models are re-estimated and
possibly reformulated as new data becomes available. In other words, econo-
mists engage in learning processes about the economy as they attempt to
improve their knowledge of the economy.
Formal study of these learning processes and their implications for macro-
economic dynamics and policy-making are becoming an increasingly impor-
tant line of research in macroeconomics.3 This research is based on a prin-
ciple of cognitive consistency stating that private agents and policy-makers
1Woodford (2003) is a monumental treatise on the subject, while the text of Walsh
(2003) provides an accessible graduate-level treatment. For surveys see e.g. Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999), and McCallum (1999).
2It should be noted that some papers do extend the standard notion of RE equilibrium
to an equilibrium with limited information. In many cases such extensions assume that
economic agents do not observe some variables but do know the structure of the economy.
3Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a treatise on the analysis of adaptive learn-
ing and its implications in macroeconomics. Evans and Honkapohja (1999), Evans and
Honkapohja (1995), Marimon (1997), Sargent (1993) and Sargent (1999) provide surveys
of the field.
2
in the economy behave like applied economists and econometricians. Thus,
it is postulated that expectations of macroeconomic variables are formed by
using statistical or other formal forecasting models and procedures.
An important policy question is whether the processes of learning create
new tasks and constraints for macroeconomic policy. An aﬃrmative answer
to this question has been demonstrated by the recent work on learning and
monetary policy.4 This view is also reflected in recent speeches by two promi-
nent Central Bank Governors, see Trichet (2005) and Bernanke (2007). This
research has shown that interest-rate setting by monetary policy-makers faces
two fundamental problems.
First, some of the proposed interest rate rules may not perform well when
the expectations of the agents are out of equilibrium. The consequences of
errors in forecasting, and the resulting correction mechanisms, may create in-
stability in the economy. For (usually non-optimal) instrument rules, Bullard
and Mitra (2002) consider the stability of rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) when monetary policy is conducted using variants of the Taylor rule.
These rules work well only under certain parameter restrictions, and Bullard
and Mitra suggests that monetary policy-making should take into account
the learnability constraints on the parameters of policy behavior. For optimal
monetary policy Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) show that certain standard forms of optimal interest rate setting by
the Central Bank can lead to expectational instability as economic agents
unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time. Evans and
Honkapohja also propose a new rule for implementing optimal policy that
always leads to stability under learning.
Second, monetary policy rules, including some formulations for optimal
setting of the instrument and some Taylor rules based on forecasts of infla-
tion and output gap, can create multiple equilibria, also called indetermi-
nacy of equilibria.5 Under indeterminacy there are multiple, even continua
of REE and the economy need not settle on the desired REE. The possible
rest points have been studied using stability under learning as a selection
criterion, see Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and the further papers by Carl-
strom and Fuerst (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005a). We note that
4Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and Bullard (2006) provide surveys of the recent re-
search.
5This was first noted by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999b), and Svens-
son and Woodford (2005). The problem was systematically explored for Taylor rules by
Bullard and Mitra (2002).
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indeterminacy is not a critical problem if the fundamental REE is the only
stable equilibrium under learning. Moreover, indeterminacy need not arise if
the forward-looking interest rate rule is carefully designed, as was shown by
Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003c), and Evans and
Honkapohja (2006).
The central message from these studies is that monetary policy has im-
portant new tasks when agents’ knowledge is imperfect and agents try to
improve their knowledge through learning. Policy should be designed to
facilitate learning by private agents so that expectations do not create insta-
bility in the economy.
Recently, many further aspects of expectations, learning and monetary
policy have been analyzed in the rapidly expanding literature. In this paper
we provide a non-technical overview of this research program. In the first part
of the paper we begin by reviewing the basic theoretical results, after which
we take up some immediate practical concerns that can arise in connection
with rules for interest rate setting. These include issues of observability in
connection with private forecasts as well as with current output and inflation
data. A second concern is knowledge of the structure of the economy that is
required for implementation of optimal interest rate policies.
In the second part of the paper we provide an overview of the recent
and ongoing developments in the literature. We first summarize research on
learnability of REE when the basic New Keynesian model is extended to in-
corporate further features of the economy. After this we discuss four topics
of applied interest in more detail: policy design under perpetual learning, es-
timated models with learning, recurrent hyperinflations, and macroeconomic
policy to combat liquidity traps and deflation.
2 The Model
We conduct our discussion using the New Keynesian model that has become
the workhorse in the analysis of monetary policy, and we employ directly
its linearized version. The original nonlinear framework is based on a repre-
sentative consumer and a continuum of firms producing diﬀerentiated goods
under monopolistic competition. Nominal stickiness of prices arises from
constraints of firms on the frequency of price changes, as originally suggested
by Calvo (1983).
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The behavior of the private sector is summarized by the two equations
xt = −ϕ(it −E∗t πt+1) +E∗t xt+1 + gt, (1)
which is the “IS” curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer opti-
mization, and
πt = λxt + βE∗t πt+1 + ut, (2)
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive firms,
often called the New Keynesian Phillips or aggregate supply curve.
Here xt and πt denote the output gap and inflation rate for period t,
respectively. it is the nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from
the steady state real interest rate. The determination of it will be discussed
below. E∗t xt+1 and E∗t πt+1 denote private sector expectations of the output
gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these
expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗ denotes RE). The parameters
ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1.
For brevity we do not discuss details of the derivation of equations (1)
and (2). It should be pointed out that the derivation is based on individ-
ual Euler equations under (identical) subjective expectations, together with
aggregation and definitions of the variables. The Euler equations for the
current period give the decisions as functions of the expected state next pe-
riod. Rules for forecasting the next period’s values of the state variables are
the other ingredient in the description of individual behavior. It is assumed
that given forecasts, private agents make decisions according to the Euler
equations.6
The shocks gt and ut are assumed to be observable and followµ
gt
ut
¶
= F
µ
gt−1
ut−1
¶
+
µ
g˜t
u˜t
¶
, (3)
where
F =
µ
μ 0
0 ρ
¶
,
6This kind of behavior is boundedly rational but in our view reasonable since agents
attempt to meet the margin of optimality between the current and the next period. Other
models of bounded rationality are possible. Recently, Bruce Preston has proposed a for-
mulation in which long horizons matter in individual behavior, see Preston (2005) and
Preston (2006).
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0 < |μ| < 1, 0 < |ρ| < 1 and g˜t ∼ iid(0, σ2g), u˜t ∼ iid(0, σ2u) are independent
white noise. gt represents shocks to government purchases and/or potential
output. ut represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those
entering through xt. For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that μ
and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
The model is closed by an equation describing interest rate setting by the
Central Bank.7 One approach examines “instrument rules” under which it is
directly specified in terms of key macroeconomic variables without explicit
policy optimization. A prominent example of this type is the standard Taylor
(1993) rule, i.e.,
it = πt + 0.5(πt − π¯) + 0.5xt,
where π¯ is the target level of inflation and the target level of the output
gap is zero. (Recall that it is specified net of the real interest rate, which in
the standard Taylor rule is usually set at 2%). More generally, Taylor rules
are of the form it = χ0 + χππt + χxxt. For convenience (and without loss of
generality) we will take the inflation target to be π¯ = 0 so that this class of
rules takes the form
it = χππt + χxxt where χπ, χx > 0. (4)
Variations of the Taylor rule replace πt and xt by lagged values or by forecasts
of current or future values.
Alternatively, interest rate policy can be derived explicitly to maximize
a policy objective function. This is frequently taken to be of the quadratic
loss form, i.e.
Et
∞X
s=0
βs
£
(πt+s − π¯)2 + αx2t+s
¤
, (5)
where π¯ is the inflation target. This type of optimal policy is often called
“flexible inflation targeting” in the current literature, see e.g. Svensson
(1999) and Svensson (2003). The policy-maker is assumed to have the same
discount factor β as the private sector. α is the relative weight placed by
7We follow the common practice of leaving hidden the government budget constraint
and the equation for the evolution of government debt. This is acceptable provided fiscal
policy appropriately accommodates the consequences of monetary policy for the govern-
ment budget constraint. The interaction of monetary and fiscal policy can be important
for the stability of equilibria under learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2007a), McCal-
lum (2003) and Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007). We discuss some aspects of the
interaction below.
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the policy-maker on the output target, and strict inflation targeting would
be the case α = 0. The loss function (5) can alternatively be viewed as a
quadratic approximation to the welfare function of a representative agent;
see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003).8
The literature on optimal policy under RE distinguishes between optimal
discretionary policy, in which the policy-maker is unable to commit to policies
for future periods, and optimal policy in which such commitment is possible.
Under commitment the policy-maker can do better because of the eﬀect on
private expectations, but commitment policy exhibits time inconsistency, in
the sense that policy-makers would have an incentive to deviate from the
policy in the future. Assuming that the policy has been initiated at some
point in the past (the “timeless perspective” described byWoodford (1999a)),
and setting π¯ = 0, the first order condition specifies
λπt + α(xt − xt−1) = 0 (6)
in every period.
Condition (6) for optimal policy with commitment is not a complete spec-
ification of monetary policy, since one must also provide a “reaction function”
for it that implements the policy. A number of interest rate rules are consis-
tent with the model (1)-(2), the optimality condition (6), and RE. However,
some of the ways of implementing “optimal” monetary policy can make the
economy vulnerable to either indeterminacy or expectational instability or
both, while other implementations are robust to these diﬃculties.
We will consider “fundamentals-based” and “expectations-based” rules.
The basic fundamentals-based rule depends only on the observable exogenous
shocks gt, ut and also on xt−1
it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut, (7)
where the optimal coeﬃcients are determined by the structural parameters
and the policy objective function. The coeﬃcients ψi are chosen so that the
eﬀects of aggregate demand shocks gt are neutralized and so that for inflation
shocks ut the optimal balance is struck between output and inflation eﬀects.
The dependence of it on xt−1 is optimally chosen to take advantage of the
8In this formulation α is a function of various “deep” structural parameters in the fully
microfounded version of the model.
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eﬀects on expectations of commitment to a rule.9
Expectations-based optimal rules are advocated in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) because, as further discussed
below, fundamentals-based optimal rules are often unstable under learning. If
private expectations are observable they can be incorporated into the interest
rate rule. If this is done appropriately, the REE will be stable under learning
and thus optimal policy can be successfully implemented. The essence of
these rules is that they do not assume RE on the part of private agents, but
are designed to feed back on private expectations in such a way that they
generate convergence to the optimal REE under learning. (If expectations
are rational, these rules deliver the optimal REE.)
The optimal expectations-based rule under commitment is
it = δLxt−1 + δπE∗t πt+1 + δxE
∗
t xt+1 + δggt + δuut. (8)
The coeﬃcients of (8) are
δL =
−α
ϕ(α+ λ2)
,
δπ = 1 +
λβ
ϕ(α+ λ2)
, δx = ϕ−1, (9)
δg = ϕ−1, δu =
λ
ϕ(α+ λ2)
.
This rule is obtained by combining the IS curve (1), the price setting equa-
tion (2) and the first order optimality condition (6), treating the private
expectations as given.10
Interest rate rules based on observations of xt and πt that (outside the
REE) only approximate the first order optimality condition (6) have been
considered by Svensson and Woodford (2005). They suggest a set of “hy-
brid”rules, the simplest of which would be
it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut + θ[πt + (α/λ)(xt − xt−1)], θ > 0. (10)
9The coeﬃcients of the interest rate rule (7) are ψx = b¯x[ϕ−1(b¯x − 1) + b¯π], ψg = ϕ−1,
and ψu = [b¯π + ϕ
−1(b¯x + ρ − 1)]c¯x + c¯πρ. Here b¯x = (2β)−1[ς − (ς2 − 4β)1/2] with
ς = 1+β+λ2/α, and b¯π = (α/λ)(1−b¯x), c¯x = −[λ+βb¯π+(1−βρ)(α/λ)]−1, c¯π = −(α/λ)c¯x.
10Under optimal discretionary policy the first order condition is λπt + αxt = 0 and the
coeﬃcients are identical except that δL = 0. The discretionary case is analyzed in Evans
and Honkapohja (2003c).
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This rule combines the fundamentals-based rule (7) with the correction for
the first order condition.11 Note that under RE the rule (10) delivers the
optimal equilibrium. Another hybrid rule has been suggested by McCallum
and Nelson (2004) taking the form
it = πt + θ[πt + (α/λ)(xt − xt−1)], (11)
where θ > 0.
3 Determinacy and Stability under Learning
Given an interest rate rule we can obtain the reduced form of the model
and study its properties under RE. Two basic properties of interest are de-
terminacy of the RE solution and stability under learning of the REE of
interest.
Consider the system given by (1), (2), (3) and one of the it policy rules
(4), (7), (8), (10) or (11). Defining the vectors
yt =
µ
xt
πt
¶
and vt =
µ
gt
ut
¶
,
the reduced form can be written as
yt =ME∗t yt+1 +Nyt−1 + Pvt (12)
for appropriate matrices M , N and P . In the case of the rule (4) we have
N = 0 and thus the simpler system
yt =ME∗t yt+1 + Pvt. (13)
We now briefly describe the concepts of determinacy/indeterminacy and
stability under adaptive (least-squares) learning using the general frameworks
(12) and (13).
The first issue of concern is whether under RE the system possesses a
unique stationary REE, in which case the model is said to be “determinate.”
If instead the model is “indeterminate,” so that multiple stationary solu-
tions exist, these will include “sunspot solutions”, i.e. REE depending on
11The model and the interest rate rule analyzed in Svensson and Woodford (2005)
incorporate additional information lags.
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extraneous random variables that influence the economy solely through the
expectations of the agents.12
The second issue concerns stability under adaptive learning. In the intro-
duction we stressed the principle of cognitive consistency according to which
agents in the model are assumed to behave like econometricians or statisti-
cians when they form their expectations. In the next section this approach is
formalized in terms of the “Perceived Law of Motion” (PLM) describing the
beliefs of the agents. These beliefs concern the stochastic process followed by
the endogenous (and exogenous) variables that need to be forecasted. The
parameters of the PLM are updated using an appropriate statistical tech-
nique, called an adaptive learning rule, and forecasts are made using the
estimated PLM at each moment of time. If private agents follow an adaptive
learning rule like recursive least squares to update the parameters of their
forecasting model, will the RE solution of interest be stable, i.e. reached
asymptotically by the learning process? If not, the REE is unlikely to be at-
tained. This is the focus of the papers by Bullard and Mitra (2002), Bullard
and Mitra (2007), Evans and Honkapohja (2003c), Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) and many others.
3.1 Digression on Methodology
Consider first the simpler reduced form (13) under RE. It is well-known that
the condition for determinacy is that both eigenvalues of the 2 × 2 matrix
M lie inside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary
solution will be of the “minimal state variable” (or MSV) form
yt = c¯vt,
where c¯ is a 2 × 2 matrix that is easily computed. If instead one or both
roots lie inside the unit circle then the model is indeterminate. There will
still be a solution of the MSV form, but there will also be other stationary
solutions.
12If the model is indeterminate, one can ask whether the sunspot solutions are stable
under learning. For a general discussion see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In general,
diﬀerent forms of sunspot solutions exist, and stability under learning can depend on the
particular representation, see Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) and Evans and McGough
(2005b).
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Next, we consider the system (13) under learning. Suppose that agents
believe that the solution is of the form
yt = a+ cvt, (14)
but that the 2× 1 vector a and the 2× 2 matrix c are not known but instead
are estimated by the private agents. (14) is the PLM of the agents. Note that
we include an intercept vector because, although for theoretical simplicity we
have translated all variables to have zero means, in practice agents will need
to estimate intercept as well as slope parameters.13
With this PLM and parameter estimates (a, c) agents would form expec-
tations as
E∗t yt+1 = a+ cFvt,
where either F is known or is also estimated. Inserting these expectations
into (13) and solving for yt we get the implied “Actual Law of Motion” or
ALM, i.e. the law that yt would follow for a fixed PLM (a, c).14 This is given
by
yt =Ma+ (P +McF )vt.
We have thus obtained an associated mapping from PLM to ALM given by
T (a, c) = (Ma,P +McF ),
and the RE solution (0, c¯) is a fixed point of this map.
Under real-time learning the sequence of events is as follows.15 Private
agents begin period t with estimates (at, ct) of the PLM parameters com-
puted on the basis of data through t − 1. Next, exogenous shocks vt are
realized and private agents form expectations E∗t yt+1 = at+ ctFvt (assuming
for convenience that F is known). Following, for example, the rule (4) the
central bank sets the interest rate it, and yt is generated according to (1)
and (2) together with the interest rate rule. This temporary equilibrium is
summarized by (13). Then at the beginning of t + 1 agents add the new
13We remark that private agents and the policymaker are here assumed to observe the
shocks vt. If vt is not observable then the PLM would be adjusted to reflect relevant
available information.
14The ALM describes the temporary equilibrium for given expectations as specified by
the forecasts from the given PLM.
15Formal analysis of learning and E-stability for multivariate linear models is provided
in Chapter 10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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data point to their information set to update their parameter estimates to
(at+1, ct+1), e.g. using least squares, and the process continues. The question
of interest is whether (at, ct)→ (0, c¯) over time.
It turns out that the answer to this question is given by the E-stability
principle, which advises us to look at the diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a, c) = T (a, c)− (a, c),
where τ denotes notional time. If the REE (0, c¯) is locally asymptotically
stable under this diﬀerential equation then the REE is stable under least
squares and closely related learning rules. Conditions for local stability of
this diﬀerential equation are known as expectational stability or “E-stability”
conditions. We will also refer to these stability conditions as the “conditions
for stability under adaptive learning”, or the “conditions for stability under
learning”, or even “learnability” of equilibrium.
For the reduced form (13) it can be shown that the E-stability conditions
are that (i) the eigenvalues of M have real parts less than one and (ii) all
products of eigenvalues ofM times eigenvalues of F have real parts less than
one. It follows that for this reduced form the conditions for stability under
adaptive learning are implied by determinacy but not vice versa.16 This is
not, however, a general result: sometimes E-stability is a stricter requirement
than determinacy and in other cases neither condition implies the other.
Consider next the reduced form (12). Standard techniques are available
to determine whether the model is determinate.17 In the determinate case
the unique stationary solution takes the MSV form
yt = a+ byt−1 + cvt, (15)
for appropriate values (a, b, c) = (0, b¯, c¯). In the indeterminate case there are
multiple solutions of this form, as well as non-MSV REE.
To examine stability under learning we treat (15) as the PLM of the
agents. Under real-time learning agents estimate the coeﬃcients a, b, c of
(15). This is a vector autoregression (VAR) with exogenous variables vt.
The estimates (at, bt, ct) are updated at each point in time by recursive least
16See McCallum (2007) for conditions when determinacy implies E-stability.
17The procedure is to rewrite the model in first order form and compare the number of
non-predetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward-looking matrix that
lie inside the unit circle.
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squares. Once again it can be shown that the E-stability principle gives the
conditions for local convergence of real-time learning.
For E-stability we compute the mapping from the PLM to the ALM as
follows. The expectations corresponding to (15) are given by
E∗t yt+1 = a+ b(a+ byt−1 + cvt) + cFvt, (16)
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when form-
ing expectations, as including vt and yt−1 but not yt. (Alternative informa-
tion assumptions would be straightforward to consider.) This leads to the
mapping from PLM to ALM given by
T (a, b, c) =
¡
M(I + b)a,Mb2 +N,M(bc+ cF ) + P
¢
, (17)
E-stability is again determined by the diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T (a, b, c)− (a, b, c), (18)
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least-squares learning.
3.2 Results for Monetary Policy
We now describe the determinacy and stability results for the interest rate
rules described in Section 2.
3.2.1 Taylor Rules
Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider Taylor-type rules and find that the results
are sensitive to whether the it rule conditions on current, lagged or expected
future output and inflation. In addition to assuming that χπ, χx ≥ 0, they
assume that the serial correlation parameters in F are nonnegative. For the
rule (4) the results are particularly straightforward and natural.18 Bullard
andMitra (2002) show that the REE is determinate and stable under learning
if and only if (using our notation)
λ(χπ − 1) + (1− β)χx > 0.
18Throughout we will assume that we are not exactly on the border of the regions of
determinacy or stability.
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In particular, if policy obeys the “Taylor principle” that χπ > 1, so that
nominal interest rates respond at least one for one with inflation, then de-
terminacy and stability are guaranteed.
If lagged or forward-looking Taylor rules are used the situation is more
complicated and full analytical results are not available. For the lagged
variable case they find that for χπ > 1 and χx > 0 suﬃciently small the
policy leads to an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. For
χπ > 1 but χx too large the system is explosive.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) also look at forward-looking versions of the
Taylor rule, taking the form
it = χπE
∗
t πt+1 + χxE
∗
t xt+1 where χπ, χx > 0, (19)
where we can interpret E∗t πt+1 and E∗t xt+1 as identical one step ahead fore-
casts, based on least-squares updating, used by both private agents and
policy-makers. They find that for χπ > 1 and χx > 0 suﬃciently small the
policy leads to an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. Now
for χπ > 1 and χx large the system is indeterminate, yet the MSV solution is
stable under learning. However, there can also exist E-stable sunspot equi-
libria as was shown by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and discussed further
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005a).
The Bullard and Mitra (2002) results emphasize the importance of the
Taylor principle in obtaining stable and determinate interest rate rules. At
the same time their results show that stability under learning must not be
taken for granted, even when the system is determinate so that a unique
stationary solution exists. The parameters of the policy rule χπ, χx must be
appropriately selected by the policy-maker when an instrument rule describes
policy. Stability under learning provides a constraint for this choice.
3.2.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
Evans and Honkapohja (2006) focus on optimal monetary policy under com-
mitment. It turns out that under the fundamentals-based policy rule (7), the
economy is invariably unstable under learning. This is the case even though
with this rule there are regions in which the optimal REE is determinate.19
19It can be noted that the learning stability results are sensitive to the detailed infor-
mation assumptions. With PLM (15) if agents can make forecasts conditional also on yt
then under the fundamentals-based rule there are both regions of stability and instability,
depending on the structural parameters.
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The basic intuition for this result can be seen from the reduced formµ
xt
πt
¶
=
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶µ
E∗t xt+1
E∗t πt+1
¶
+ (20)µ
−ϕψx 0
−λϕψx 0
¶µ
xt−1
πt−1
¶
+
µ
−ϕψu
1− λϕψu
¶
ut.
Since typically β+λϕ > 1, say, upward mistakes in E∗t πt+1 lead to higher πt,
both directly and indirectly through lower ex ante real interest rates, which
under learning sets oﬀ a cumulative movement away from REE. The feedback
from xt−1 under the fundamentals-based it rule with commitment (7) does
not stabilize the economy. Figure 1 shows how divergence from the optimal
REE occurs under the rule (7).20
The instability of the fundamentals-based rules, designed after all to ob-
tain optimal policy, serves as a strong warning to policy-makers not to au-
tomatically assume that RE will be attained. It is necessary to examine
explicitly the robustness of contemplated policy rules to private agent learn-
ing.
In Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) we
show how the problems of instability and indeterminacy can be overcome if
private agents’ expectations are observable, so that interest rate rules can
be in part conditioned on these expectations. In Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) we show that under the rule (8) the economy is determinate and the
optimal REE is stable under private agent learning for all possible structural
parameter values. The key to the stability results can be seen from the
reduced formµ
xt
πt
¶
=
Ã
0 − λβ
α+λ2
0 αβ
α+λ2
!µ
E∗t xt+1
E∗t πt+1
¶
+ (21)µ α
α+λ2
0
αλ
α+λ2
0
¶µ
xt−1
πt−1
¶
+
µ − λ
α+λ2
α
α+λ2
¶
ut.
In (21) the feedback from inflation expectations to actual inflation is stabiliz-
ing since the coeﬃcient αβ
α+λ2
is less than one and the influence of xt−1 is also
weak. Thus, deviations from RE are oﬀset by policy and in such a way that
20Figures 1 and 2 are based on the calibration by McCallum and Nelson (1999). Using
other calibrations would yield similar results.
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Figure 1: Instability with fundamentals-based rule
16
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
time
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 x
 fr
om
 R
E
Figure 2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
time
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 π
 
fro
m
 R
E
Figure 2: Stability with expectations-based rule
under learning private agents are guided over time to form expectations con-
sistent with the optimal REE. Our expectations-based rule obeys a form of
the Taylor principle since δπ > 1. Figure 2 illustrates convergence of learning
under the rule (8).
Note that our optimal policy rule conditions on both private expectations
and observable exogenous shocks, as well as lagged output. We also remark
that, when computing the optimal expectations-based rule, it is important for
the central bank to use the correct structural model of the IS and price setting
relationships, which in turn depend on the specific form of boundedly rational
individual behavior. For example, the form of the optimal expectations-
based rule would be diﬀerent if one adopted the long-horizon decision rules
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advocated by Preston (2005) and Preston (2006).
There are some cases in which variations of fundamentals-based rules can
perform well, at least for a relevant region of structural parameter values.
For the “hybrid”rule suggested by Svensson and Woodford (2005) numerical
analysis shows that, in calibrated models, the rule (10) yields both determi-
nacy and stability under learning for suﬃciently high values of θ. Similarly,
the hybrid rule suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) appears to deliver
E-stability of the REE. Another favorable case emerges if the policy objective
(5) is extended to include a motive for interest rate stabilization. Duﬀy and
Xiao (2007b) show that in this case the fundamentals-based interest rules
can deliver determinacy and E-stability for a region of parameter values that
includes the usual calibrations used in the literature. However, see our com-
ments below concerning stability with constant-gain learning for operational
versions of these rules.
Finally, we remark that other formulations of monetary policy than in-
terest rate rules could be analyzed. For example, policy could be formulated
as a money supply rule, where a prominent case is the Friedman proposal for
k−percent money growth. Evans and Honkapohja (2003d) show that Fried-
man’s rule always delivers determinacy and E-stability in the standard New
Keynesian model. However, it does not perform well in terms of the policy
objective function.
3.3 Some Practical Concerns
Many of the it rules discussed above have the potential diﬃculty that they
may not be operational, as discussed in McCallum (1999). For example,
McCallum and Nelson (2004) note that it may be unrealistic to assume that
policy-makers can condition policy on current xt and πt. Similarly, one could
question whether accurate observations on private expectations are available.
We consider these points in the reverse order. In the subsequent discussion
we focus on the expectations-based rule (8), the Taylor rule (4) and the
hybrid rules (10) and (11).
3.3.1 Observability of Private Expectations
The expectations-based rule (8) requires observations of current private ex-
pectations of future variables. While survey data on private forecasts of
future inflation and various measures of future output exist, there are con-
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cerns about the accuracy of this data. If observations of expectations are
subject to a white noise measurement error then our stability and determi-
nacy results are unaﬀected. Furthermore, if measurement errors are small
then the policy will be close to optimal. However, if measurement errors are
large then this will lead to a substantial deterioration in performance. In this
case one might consider substituting a proxy for such observations. Since we
are assuming that private agents forecast by running VARs, the most natural
proxy is for the Central Bank to estimate corresponding VARs and use these
in (8).
Suppose now that agents and the Central Bank begin with diﬀerent ini-
tial estimates, possibly have diﬀerent learning rules and/or use data sets with
diﬀerent initial dates. When the private agents and the Central Bank are sep-
arately estimating and forecasting using VARs, we must distinguish between
their expectations. An extended E-stability analysis for economies with het-
erogenous expectations gives the conditions for convergence of heterogeneous
learning, as shown in Honkapohja and Mitra (2006). For the case of opti-
mal discretionary policy and expectations-based interest rate rules this issue
was analyzed in Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b). In Evans and Honkapohja
(2003a) it was shown that using VAR proxies can also achieve convergence
to the optimal REE with commitment.
We remark that the form of the extended E-stability conditions for hetero-
geneous learning depends on the nature of heterogeneity among agents. If the
heterogeneities are transient (in the sense described in Honkapohja and Mi-
tra (2006)), then the standard E-stability conditions directly apply. In cases
of persistent heterogeneity the learning stability conditions are somewhat
sensitive to the detailed assumptions. Additional restrictions are required
for stability in some cases, e.g. if private agents estimate parameters using
stochastic gradient techniques while the Central Bank uses least squares.
3.3.2 Non-Availability of Current Data
A diﬃculty with the standard Taylor rule (4) as well as some other rules,
including the hybrid rules of Svensson and Woodford (2005) and McCallum
and Nelson (2004), is that they presuppose that the policy-maker can ob-
serve both current output gap and inflation when setting the interest rate.
McCallum (1999) has criticized such policy rules as not being “operational”.
In the case of the Taylor rule, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that this
problem of non-observability can be avoided by the use of “nowcasts” E∗t yt
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in place of the actual data yt. Determinacy and E-stability conditions are
not aﬀected by this modification.
For the hybrid rules performance depends on the rule. Numerical analysis
suggests that E-stability can still be achieved for Svensson-Woodford rule un-
der standard values of the parameters. In contrast, for the McCallum-Nelson
rule the situation is more complex. McCallum and Nelson (2004) suggest
using forward expectations in place of actual data. If this is done, determi-
nacy and stability under learning are no longer guaranteed, and suﬃciently
large values of the policy parameter θ induce both instability under learning
and indeterminacy. This is unfortunate since large values of θ are needed
to achieve a close approximation to optimal policy. Evans and Honkapohja
(2003a) argue that the loss in welfare relative to the optimum is significant
if θ is required to satisfy the constraints of E-stability and determinacy.
There is an additional issue with stability under learning that arises when
current data are not observable for the policy-maker. If private agents are
using constant-gain learning (see Section 5.2 for details), the stability condi-
tions are more demanding. As discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2007b),
both hybrid rules suggested by Svensson and Woodford (2005) and McCal-
lum and Nelson (2004), as well as the Taylor-type optimal rule of Duﬀy and
Xiao (2007b), are subject to the problem of instability under constant-gain
learning for many realistic gain parameter values.
3.3.3 Imperfect Knowledge of Structural Parameters
A third practical concern is that the use of optimal rules requires knowledge
of the true values of the structural parameters on the part of the Central
Bank. Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a)
extend the basic analysis to a situation where the Central Bank estimates the
structural parameters ϕ and λ in equations (1)-(2) and in each period uses
the current estimates in its optimal interest rate rule.21 The basic results
concerning optimal interest rate rules extend naturally to this situation. The
fundamental-based rules under commitment and discretion are not learn-
able, while the corresponding expectations-based rules deliver convergence
of simultaneous learning by the private agents and the Central Bank.
Since optimal monetary policy depends on structural parameters, uncer-
tainty about their values is an issue, even if asymptotically their values can be
21It is natural to assume that the discount factor β and the policy weight α are known
to the Central Bank.
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learned by the Central Bank. Evans and McGough (2007) examine optimal
Taylor-type rules based on Bayesian model averaging, where determinacy and
stability under learning are imposed across all plausible structural parameter
values.
The importance of structural uncertainty is also stressed in Orphanides
and Williams (2007). Their model incorporates both imperfect knowledge
about the natural rates of interest and unemployment and constant-gain
learning by private agents. They emphasize monetary policy rules that are
robust in all of these dimensions.
4 Further Developments
There has been a great deal of recent work that extends the results on mone-
tary policy and learning. Several of these are discussed in some detail below.
One of the more significant issues, from an applied point of view, is the
issue of “constant” gain or “perpetual” learning, in which private agents up-
date estimates using least squares, but discount past data. Consequently,
under learning agents’ expectations never fully converge to the REE, but,
provided the REE is stable, have expectations that are (asymptotically) in
a neighborhood of the REE. Several papers discuss the issue of optimal pol-
icy when the learning process itself is incorporated into the optimal policy
problem, either during the learning transition or under perpetual learning.
The main papers are Orphanides and Williams (2005b), Molnar and Santoro
(2006), Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006), Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2005)
and Orphanides and Williams (2007). A related issue studied by Ferrero
(2007) concerns speed of convergence of learning for alternative policy rules.
Arifovic, Bullard, and Kostyshyna (2007) consider the implications of social
learning for monetary policy rules.
Extensions of the learning stability results to open economy and multi-
country settings have been made by Llosa and Tuesta (2006), Bullard and
Schaling (2006), Bullard and Singh (2006), Zanna (2006), and Wang (2006)
among others. These papers examine both Taylor-type rules and interest-rate
rules that target real exchange rates.
In the standard New Keynesian model, monetary policy works entirely via
the demand side. Kurozumi (2006) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) consider how
determinacy and learning conditions are altered when monetary policy has
direct eﬀects on inflation. Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2007), Duﬀy and
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Xiao (2007a) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2007a) have examined in detail how
the learning stability conditions for Taylor rules are modified when capital
is incorporated into the New Keynesian model. The results for models with
capital depend on precisely how capital is modeled, i.e. on whether or not
adjustment costs are included and on whether there is firm-specific capital or
a rental market for capital. One result that emerges in some of these settings
is that determinacy and E-stability requires the interest-rate rule to have a
positive response to the output gap.
Detailed policy issues arise in which learning plays a key role. Some
central banks often set monetary policy based on the constant interest rate
that is expected to deliver a target inflation rate over a specified horizon.
How this aﬀects stability under learning is studied in Honkapohja and Mitra
(2005a). Transparency and communication of targets and rules are further
considered by Berardi and Duﬀy (2007) and Eusepi and Preston (2007).
While the New Keynesian model is based on a linearized set-up under
Calvo-type pricing, nonlinear settings based on quadratic costs of price ad-
justments suggested by Rotemberg (1982) have been useful for studying the
possibility of liquidity trap equilibria.22 This issue was investigated under
perfect foresight by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001). This set-
up was investigated under learning for the case of flexible prices by Evans
and Honkapohja (2005) and in a sticky-price version by Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2007). The latter paper is discussed further below. Sticky-
information models that incorporate learning have also been developed. See
Branch, Carlson, Evans, and McGough (2006b) and Branch, Carlson, Evans,
and McGough (2006a).
A number of theoretical learning topics have recently been pursued that
have a bearing on monetary policy issues. Forward-looking Taylor rules can
generate indeterminacy for some choices of parameters. In these cases can
stationary sunspot equilibria be stable under learning? For the New Keyne-
sian setting this issue has been examined by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), and Evans and McGough (2005a), where con-
ditions for stable sunspots are obtained in linearized models, and by Eusepi
(2007), who looks at the question in a nonlinear setting. Evans, Honkapohja,
and Marimon (2007) show that stable sunspot equilibria can arise in a cash-
in-advance framework in which part of the government deficit is financed by
22Using a linearized New Keynesian model, the possibility of liquidity traps under learn-
ing was studied by Bullard and Cho (2005).
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seigniorage.
Constant-gain learning raises the issue of the appropriate choice of gain
parameter (see Evans and Honkapohja (1993), Chapter 14 of Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003)). This issue is considered
by Evans and Ramey (2006) in a simple monetary set-up in which private
agents face an unknown regime switching process. This paper shows how the
Lucas Critique, based on RE, can carry over to learning dynamics in which
agents have misspecified models.
Monetary policy with near-rational expectations has been studied by
Woodford (2005) and Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2007). The Wood-
ford paper develops a (minmax) concept of policy robustness in which policy-
makers protect against agents’ expectations being distorted away from RE
within some class of near rational expectations. Bullard, Evans, and Honkapo-
hja (2007) consider the possibility that “expert” judgement based on extra-
neous factors believed to be present can become almost self-fulfilling. They
show how to alter monetary policy to protect against these near-rational
“exuberance equilibria.”
Heterogeneous expectations is another area increasingly receiving atten-
tion. Theoretical work on monetary policy that allows for learning hetero-
geneity across private agents, or between policy-makers and private agents,
includes Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001), Giannitsarou (2003),
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b), and Honkapohja and Mitra (2006). A re-
lated line of thought (see Brock and Hommes (1997) and Branch and Evans
(2006a)) emphasizes that private agents may have diﬀerent types of pre-
dictors, with the proportions of agents using the diﬀerent forecast methods
changing over time according to relative forecast performance. For an ap-
plication to monetary inflation models and monetary policy see Branch and
Evans (2007) and Brazier, Harrison, King, and Yates (2006).
A number of empirical applications of learning to macroeconomics and
monetary policy have recently been developed. Bullard and Eusepi (2005)
and Orphanides andWilliams (2005c) look at estimated models that focus on
the explanation of the large increase in inflation rates in the 1970s. Incorpo-
rating learning as a way to explain persistence in New Keynesian models has
been examined, using US data, by Milani (2005) and Milani (2007). First
attempts to incorporate learning to applied stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models have most recently been made, see Slobodyan and Wouters
(2007) and Murray (2007). Using least-squares learning models and/or dy-
namic predictors to explain expectations data has been studied in Branch
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(2004), Branch and Evans (2006b), Orphanides and Williams (2005a), Bas-
devant (2005), Pfajfar (2007), and Pfajfar and Santoro (2007b).
Other important empirical learning papers include Marcet and Nicolini
(2003), which studies hyperinflation in South American countries (this paper
is discussed in detail below), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Sargent, Williams,
and Zha (2006), Ellison and Yates (2007), and Carboni and Ellison (2007).
The latter papers emphasize the importance of policy-maker model uncer-
tainty and the role of central bank learning in explaining the historical evo-
lution of inflation and unemployment in the post 1950 period.
In the next sections we discuss four recent topics that address important
applied questions. Learning plays a crucial role in these analyzes, but the
main focus in each case goes well beyond stability of REE under learning.
5 Perpetual Learning and Persistence
In the preceding sections our concern has been the stability of the REE under
least-squares (LS) learning. That is, we used LS learning to assess whether
an REE is attainable if we model agents as econometricians. Orphanides
and Williams (2005b) (OW) show that taking the further step of replacing
(“decreasing gain”) LS learning with constant-gain learning has important
implications for monetary policy, even if the REE is stable under learning.
OW work with a simple two-equation macro model. The first equation is
a New Classical expectations-augmented Phillips curve with inertia:
πt+1 = φπet+1 + (1− φ)πt + αyt+1 + et+1, (22)
where πt+1 is the rate of inflation between period t and period t+ 1, πet+1 is
the rate of inflation over this period expected at time t, yt+1 is the level of
the output gap in t + 1 and et+1 is a white noise inflation shock. (1 − φ)πt
represents intrinsic inflation persistence. We assume 0 < φ < 1.
The second equation is an aggregate demand relation that embodies a
lagged policy eﬀect,
yt+1 = xt + ut+1.
xt is set by monetary policy at t and ut+1 is white noise. Through monetary
policy it is assumed that policy-makers are able one period ahead to control
aggregate output up to the unpredictable random disturbance ut+1. This
equation basically replaces the IS and LM curves. It is convenient for the
task at hand, but of course suppresses issues of monetary control.
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5.1 Optimal Policy under Rational Expectations
At time t the only state variable is πt. Policy-makers have a target inflation
rate π∗ and care about the deviation of πt from π∗. Their instrument is xt
and they are assumed to follow a rule of the form
xt = −θ(πt − π∗). (23)
Policy-makers also care about the output gap yt+1. Since stable inflation
requires Eyt = 0, policy-makers are assumed to choose θ to minimize
L = (1− ω)Ey2t + ωE(πt − π∗)2.
This is a standard quadratic loss function. We can think of ω as reflect-
ing policy-makers preferences, which may (or may not) be derived from the
preferences of the representative agent.
Under RE, πet+1 = Etπt+1 and it follows that
πet+1 = πt +
α
1− φxt.
Substituting into (22) yields
πt+1 = πt +
α
1− φxt + αut+1 + et+1.
Substituting in the policy rule (23) yields
π˜t+1 =
µ
1− φ− αθ
1− φ
¶
π˜t + αut+1 + et+1,
where π˜t = πt − π∗.
Computing Eπ˜2t and Ey2t it is straightforward to minimize L over θ to
get θP , the optimal choice of θ under RE. OW show that
θP = θP (ω, (1− φ)/α),
and that θP is increasing in both ω and in the degree of inertia, 1−φ. Varying
ω leads to an eﬃciency frontier, described by a familiar trade-oﬀ between σπ
and σy, sometimes called the “Taylor curve.”
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For this choice of feedback parameter, in the REE inflation follows the
process
πt = cP0 + c
P
1 πt−1 + noiset
Etπt+1 = cP0 + c
P
1 πt,
where
cP0 =
αθP
1− φand c
P
1 = 1−
αθP
1− φ .
Here noiset is white noise. The superscript “P” refers to “perfect knowledge,”
which OW use as a synonym for RE.
Thus under RE the problem is quite straightforward. How “aggressive”
policy should be with respect to deviations of inflation from target depends
in a natural way on the structural parameters φ, α and the policy-maker
preferences as described by ω.
5.2 Least-Squares Learning
We now make the crucial step of backing away from RE. Instead of assuming
that agents are endowed a priori with RE, we model the agents as forecasting
in the same way that an econometrician might: by assuming a simple time
series model for the variable of interest, and by estimating its parameters and
using the estimated model to forecast. Specifically, suppose private agents
believe that inflation follows an AR(1) process, as it does in an REE, but
that they do not know cP0 , cP1 . Instead they estimate the parameters of
πt = c0 + c1πt−1 + vt
by a least-squares-type regression, and at time t forecast
πet+1 = c0,t + c1,tπt.
Over time the estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated as new data become available.
We consider two cases for this updating.
First, suppose that agents literally do least squares using all the data. We
assume that policy-makers do not explicitly take account of private agent
learning and follow the feedback rule with θ = θP . Then, with “infinite
memory” (no discounting of observations), one can show that
c0,t, c1,t → cP0 , cP1 w.p.1.
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Asymptotically, we get the optimal REE.
OWmake a small but significant change to the standard least-squares up-
dating formula. With regular LS each data point counts equally. When ex-
pressed in terms of a recursive algorithm (“recursive least squares” or “RLS”)
the coeﬃcients estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated in response to the most recent
data point with a weight proportion to the sample size 1/t. We often say
that RLS has a “decreasing gain” since the “gain” or weight on each data
point is κt = 1/t, which declines towards 0 as t→∞. OW instead consider
“constant gain” RLS in which past data is discounted. In terms of the RLS
algorithm, this is accomplished technically by setting the gain, the weight on
the most recent observation used to update estimates, to a small constant
i.e. setting κt = κ (e.g. 0.05). This is equivalent to using weighted least
squares with weights declining geometrically in time as we move backwards
from the current date.
Why would it be natural for agents to use a constant rather than decreas-
ing gain? The main rationale for this procedure is that it allows estimates
to remain alert to structural shifts. As economists, and as econometricians,
we tend to believe that structural changes occasionally occur, and we might
therefore assume that private agents also recognize and allow for this. Al-
though in principle one might attempt to model the process of structural
change, this tends to unduly strain the amount of knowledge we have about
the economic structure. A reasonable alternative is to adjust parameter
estimators to reflect the fact that recent observations convey more accurate
information on the economy’s law of motion than do data further in the past,
and “constant gain” estimators are one very natural way of accomplishing
this down-weighting of past data. Another possibility that is sometimes used
in practice is to use a rolling data-window of finite length.23
5.3 Implications of Constant-Gain Least Squares
With constant-gain procedures, estimates no longer fully converge to the
REE. The estimators c0,t, c1,t converge instead to a stochastic process. Be-
cause of this OW use the term “perpetual learning” to refer to the constant
gain case.
If the gain parameter κ is very small, then estimators will be close to
23Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) discuss the implications of bounded memory as a model
of learning.
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the REE values for most of the time with high probability, and output and
inflation will be near their REE paths. Nonetheless, small plausible values
like κ = 0.05 can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes in the calibrations OW
consider. They analyze the results using simulations, with φ = 0.75 and
α = 0.25. They consider θ ∈ {0.1, 0.6, 1.0}, which corresponds to weights
ω = 0.01, 0.5 and 1, respectively, under RE.
Their main findings are: (i) the standard deviations of c0,t and c1,t are
large even though forecast performance remains good, (ii) there is a sub-
stantial increase in the persistence of inflation, compared to the REE, as
measured by the AR(1) coeﬃcient for πt, and (iii) the policy frontier shifts
out very substantially and sometimes in a non-monotonic way.
5.4 Policy Implications
Under perpetual learning by private agents, if policy-makers keep to the same
class of rules
xt = −θS(πt − π∗),
then they should choose a diﬀerent θ than under RE. Here the notation
θS is meant to indicate that we restrict policy-makers to choose from the
same “simple” class of policy rules. There are four main implications for
policy in the context of constant-gain (perpetual) learning by private agents.
First, the “naive” policy choice, i.e. the policy that assumes RE (“perfect
knowledge”) on the part of agents, can be strictly ineﬃcient when in fact
the agents are following perpetual learning with κ > 0: there are cases in
which increasing θS above θP would decrease the standard deviations of both
inflation and output. Second, in general policy should be more hawkish, i.e.
under perpetual learning the monetary authorities should pick a larger θS
than if agents had RE.
Third, following a sequence of unanticipated inflation shocks, inflation
doves (i.e. policy-makers with low θ reflecting a low ω) can do very poorly,
as these shocks can lead expectations to temporarily but persistently deviate
substantially from RE. Finally, if the inflation target π∗ is known to private
agents, so that they need estimate only the slope parameter c1 using the
PLM
πt+1 − π∗ = c1(πt − π∗) + vt+1
then the policy frontier is more favorable than when the intercept c0 is not
known. One way to interpret this is that central bank transparency is useful.
28
ω0 1
L
RE
Efficient
Naive
25.,75.0 == αφ
Figure 3: Policy-maker’s loss
Figure 3 indicates how the performance of policy depends on expectations
formation and what the policy-maker assumes about it. The middle curve is
the eﬃcient policy under learning, while “naive” refers to the case in which
policy presumes RE while agents are in fact learning with gain κ = 0.05.
Thus “perpetual learning” turns out to have major policy implications for
policy, even when the deviation from REE might be thought not too large.
The main policy implication is that with perpetual learning, there should be
a policy bias towards “hawkishness.” The intuition for this result is intuitive:
a more hawkish (high θ) policy helps to keep inflation expectations πet+1 “in
line,” i.e. closer to RE values. This qualitative result also emerges in the
more general setting in Orphanides and Williams (2007).
6 Estimated Models with Learning
The OW results suggest another implication of learning that goes beyond
policy, namely that learning itself can be a source of persistence in macro-
economic dynamics. This line of thought has been pursued by Milani (2005),
Milani (2007). The starting point is that inflation persistence in the data
is much higher than arises from the basic New Keynesian model. For a
good empirical fit to the data, a backward-looking component is needed in
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the New Keynesian Phillips curve under the RE assumption. The source
of the backward-looking component used in these “hybrid” models, is, how-
ever, controversial. Milani (2005) considers the question of whether learning
dynamics can provide some or all of the persistence needed to fit the data.
To investigate this, consider the most frequently used modification to
the basic New Keynesian model, namely adding indexation to Calvo price
setting; that is, firms that do not optimize in any given period set prices that
are indexed to past inflation. This yields
πt =
γ
1 + βγ
πt−1 +
β
1 + βγ
E∗t πt+1 +
δ
1 + βγ
xt + ut.
where xt is the output gap and γ measures the degree of indexation. Earlier
work under RE empirically finds values of γ that are close to 1.
For expectations we assume a PLM of the form
πt = φ0 + φ1πt−1 + εt,
and agents at t are assumed to use data {1, πi}t−10 to estimate φ0, φ1 using
constant-gain least squares. For time t estimates φ0,t, φ1,t the agents’ forecasts
are given by
E∗t πt+1 = φ0,t + φ1,tE
∗
t πt
= φ0,t + φ1,t(φ0,t + φ1,tπt−1),
where we assume that the aggregate inflation rate πt is not included in the
agents information set at the time of their forecasts.
The implied ALM is
πt =
βφ0,t(1 + φ1,t)
1 + βγ
+
γ + βφ21,t
1 + βγ
πt−1 +
δ
1 + βγ
xt + ut.
Alternatively, Milani (2005) also considers using real marginal cost as the
driving variable in place of output gap xt. To estimate the model for the
US, Milani computes inflation from the GDP deflator and output gap as
detrended GDP, while real marginal cost is proxied by deviation of labor
income share from 1960:01 to 2003:04. Agents’ initial parameter estimates
are obtained by using pre-sample data 1951-1959.
A two-step procedure is used. First, the PLM is estimated from constant-
gain learning using an assumed constant gain of κ = 0.015. This is in line with
30
earlier empirical estimates. Then Milani estimates the ALM using nonlinear
least squares. This procedure allows us to estimate the structural source of
persistence, γ, taking into account the learning eﬀects. The PLM parameter
estimates show the following pattern:
(i) φ1,t was initially low in 1950s and 60s, then higher (up to 0.958), and
then declined somewhat to values above 0.8.
(ii) φ0,t was initially low, then became much higher and then gradually
declined after 1980.
The ALM structural estimates in particular generate a degree of indexa-
tion of γ = 0.139 (with the output gap). The results are fairly robust to other
choices of gain κ that appear appropriate based on Schwartz’ BIC model fit
criterion. The estimate of γ is not significantly diﬀerent from zero, and is in
sharp contrast to the high levels of γ found under the RE assumption. Thus
it appears that the data are consistent with the “learning” interpretation of
the sources of persistence for inflation.
Milani (2007) estimates the full New Keynesian model under learning. He
finds that also the degree of habit persistence is low in IS curve. This is in
contrast with the usual extension of the New Keynesian model under RE that
is often employed to improve the empirical fit of the model. Milani’s work
can be seen as a starting point for the very recent attempts by Slobodyan
and Wouters (2007) and Murray (2007) to incorporate learning into DSGE
models.
7 Recurrent Hyperinflations
The paper by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) starts from the standard hyperin-
flation model with learning and extends it to an open economy setting. The
aim is to provide a unified theory to explain the recurrent hyperinflations
experienced by many countries in the 1980s.
7.1 The Basic Hyperinflation Model
The starting point is the theoretical model sometimes known as the seignior-
age model of inflation. (e.g. see Chapter 11 of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001)). The Cagan model is based on the linear money demand equation
Mdt /Pt = φ− φγ(P et+1/Pt) if 1− γ(P et+1/Pt) > 0 and 0 otherwise,
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which can be obtained from an overlapping generations (OG) endowment
economy with log utility. This equation is combined with exogenous govern-
ment purchases dt > 0 that are entirely financed by seigniorage:
Mt =Mt−1 + dtPt.
Rewriting this as Mt/Pt = (Mt−1/Pt−1)(Pt−1/Pt) + d, setting Mdt = Mt and
assuming dt = d we get
Pt
Pt−1
=
1− γ(P et /Pt−1)
1− γ(P et+1/Pt)− d/φ
.
Under perfect foresight, i.e. P et+1/Pt = Pt+1/Pt, there are two steady
states, βL < βH , provided d ≥ 0 is not too large, while if d is above a
critical value then there are no perfect foresight steady states. There is
also a continuum of perfect foresight paths converging to βH . Some early
theorists suggested that these paths might provide an explanation for actual
hyperinflation episodes.
Consider now the situation under adaptive learning. Suppose the PLM
is that the inflation process is perceived to be a steady state, i.e. Pt+1/Pt =
β + ηt, where ηt is perceived white noise. Then PLM expectations areµ
Pt+1
Pt
¶e
= β,
and the corresponding ALM is
Pt
Pt−1
=
1− γβ
1− γβ − d/φ ≡ T (β; d).
Under steady-state learning, agents estimate β based on past average
inflation, i.e. (Pt+1/Pt)
e = βt where
βt = βt−1 + t
−1(Pt−1/Pt−2 − βt−1).
This is simply a recursive algorithm for the average inflation rate, which is
equivalent to a least-squares regression on a constant.24 It can be shown
24One can consider more general classes of PLM. Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006)
study the circumstances in which autoregressive PLMs can converge to hyperinflation
paths.
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Figure 4: Figure 4: Steady state learning in the hyperinflation model
that stability of this learning rule is governed by the E-stability diﬀerential
equation
dβ/dτ = T (β; d)− β,
where d is a fixed parameter. Since 0 < T 0(βL) < 1 and T 0(βH) > 1, βL is
E-stable, and therefore locally stable under learning, while βH is not. This
is illustrated in Figure 4.
We remark that an increase in d shifts T (β) up, so the comparative sta-
tics of βL are natural but those of βH are counterintuitive. This, together
with the fact that the steady state βH is not stable under learning suggests
problems with the RE version of this model as a theoretical explanation for
hyperinflations.
7.2 Empirical Background
Marcet and Nicolini (MN) list four stylized facts about hyperinflation episodes
during the 1980s in a number of South American countries (as well as some
episodes in other places and at other times):
1. Recurrence of hyperinflation episodes.
2. ERR (exchange rate rules) stop hyperinflations, though new hyperin-
flations eventually occur.
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3. During a hyperinflation, seigniorage and inflation are not highly cor-
related.
4. Average inflation and seigniorage are strongly positively correlated
across countries. Hyperinflations only occur in countries where seigniorage
is on average high.
Stabilization plans to deal with hyperinflation have been based either
on heterodox policy (ERR) or orthodox policy (permanently reducing the
deficit). Policies that combine both elements appear to have been successful
in stopping hyperinflations permanently.
7.3 The Marcet-Nicolini Model
MN use an open economy version of the overlapping-generations hyperinfla-
tion model. This is a flexible price model with PPP, so that
P ft et = Pt,
where P ft is the foreign price of goods, assumed exogenous. There is a cash-
in-advance constraint for local currency on net purchases of consumption.
This generates the demand by young agents for the local currency. Hence
we continue to have the money demand equation as in the basic model.
Government expenditure dt is assumed to be iid.
There are two exchange rate regimes. In the floating regime the govern-
ment does not buy or sell foreign exchange, and its budget constraint is as
in the basic model. There is no foreign trade, and the economy behaves just
like the closed economy model, with PPP determining the price of foreign
currency by et = Pt/P
f
t .
In the ERR (exchange rate rule) regime, the government buys or sells
foreign exchange Rt as needed to meet a target exchange rate et. Sales of
foreign exchange generate revenue in addition to seigniorage that the gov-
ernment can use to finance government purchases, i.e. (Mt −Mt−1)/Pt =
dt + ((Rt − Rt−1)et)/Pt. In equilibrium, any increase in reserves must be
matched by a trade surplus, i.e. (Rt−Rt−1)et = TBt ·Pt, where TBt is total
endowment minus total private consumption minus dt.
The key question is the form of the ERR. When an ERR is adopted it is
assumed that the object is to stabilize inflation at a targeted rate β¯. This is
accomplished by setting et to satisfy
P ft
P ft−1
et
et−1
= β¯,
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which by PPP guarantees
Pt
Pt−1
= β¯.
Under ERR this last equation determines Pt. Given expectations, money
demand determines Mt. Reserves Rt must then adjust to satisfy the flow
government budget constraint.
The remaining question is how the government chooses exchange rate
regimes. We assume there is a maximum inflation rate tolerated, βU . ERR
is imposed only in periods when inflation would otherwise exceed this bound
(or if no positive Pt would otherwise clear the market).
7.4 Learning
MN argue that under RE the model cannot properly explain the stylized facts
of hyperinflation outlined above. An adaptive learning formulation will be
more successful. MN use a variation of the simple (decreasing gain) steady-
state learning rule, given above, in which the gain is made state contingent:
βt = βt−1 +
1
αt
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¶
,
with given β0. Here 1/αt = κt is what we have called the gain, and αt =
αt−1 + 1 corresponds to decreasing gain learning, while αt = α¯ > 1 is a
constant-gain algorithm. (αt can also be thought of as the “eﬀective sample
size”). MN consider a version in which agents switch between decreasing and
constant gain according to recent performance. Specifically, αt = αt−1 + 1 if¯¯¯³
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
/βt−1
¯¯¯
falls below some bound υ and otherwise αt = α¯.
The qualitative features of the model are approximated by the system
Pt
Pt−1
= h(βt−1, dt) where (24)
h(β, d) =
½
T (β; d) if 0 < T (β; d) < βU
β¯ otherwise .
Figure 5 describes the dynamics of system (24).
There is a stable region consisting of values of β below the “unstable” high
inflation steady state βH and an unstable region that lies above it. Here we
set β¯ = βL, the low inflation steady state. βU is set at a value above βH .
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Figure 5: Figure 5: Inflation as a function of expected inflation
This gives rise to very natural recurring hyperinflation dynamics: Starting
from βL a sequence of random shocks may push βt into the unstable region,
at which point the gain is revised upward to 1/α¯ and inflation follows an
explosive path until it is stabilized by ERR. Then the process begins again.
The model with learning has the following features:
(i) There may be eventual convergence to RE. This can occur if the ran-
dom shocks/learning dynamics do not push βt into the unstable region for a
long time. Then decreasing gain may lead to asymptotic convergence to βL.
(ii) A higher E(dt) makes average inflation higher and the frequency of
hyperinflations greater. Orthodox combined with heterodox policies make
sense as a way to end hyperinflations.
(iii) All four stylized facts listed above can be matched using this model,
and simulations of a calibrated model look very plausible.
Overall this appears to be a very successful application of boundedly
rational learning to a major empirical issue.
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8 Liquidity Traps and Deflationary Spirals
Deflation and liquidity traps have been a concern in recent times. The paper
by Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) considers issues of liquidity traps
and deflationary spirals under learning in a New Keynesian model. As we
have seen, contemporaneous Taylor-type interest-rate rules should respond
to the inflation rate more than one for one in order to ensure determinacy
and stability under learning. However, as emphasized by Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2001), if one considers the interest-rate rule globally, not
just in a neighborhood of the target inflation rate, the requirement that net
nominal interest rates must be nonnegative implies that the rule must be
nonlinear and also, for any continuous rule, that there exists a second steady
state at a lower (possibly negative) inflation rate. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6, which shows the interest-rate policy R = 1 + f(π) as a function of
π.25 The straight line in the figure is the Fisher equation R = π/β, which is
obtained from the usual Euler equation for consumption in a steady state.
R
π
π/β
1
π*π L
1 + f(π)
Figure 6: Multiple steady states with global Taylor rule
Here we are now using R to stand for the interest rate factor (so that the
net interest rate is R − 1), and πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation factor, so that
25Of course, Taylor rules usually also include a dependence on aggregate output, which
we omit for simplicity.
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π − 1 is the net inflation rate. In the Figure π∗ denotes the intended steady
state, at which the “Taylor principle” of a more than one-for-one response
is satisfied, and πL is the unintended steady state. πL may correspond to
either a very low positive inflation rate or to a negative net inflation rate,
i.e. deflation. The zero lower bound corresponds to R = 1. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) show that under RE, there is a continuum
of “liquidity trap” paths that converge on πL. The pure RE analysis thus
suggests a serious risk of the economy following these “liquidity trap” paths.
What happens under learning? In Evans and Honkapohja (2005) we
analyzed a flexible-price perfect competition model. We showed that defla-
tionary paths are possible, but that the real risk, under learning, were paths
in which inflation slipped below πL and then continued to fall further. For
this flexible-price model we showed that this could be avoided by a change
in monetary policy at low inflation rates. The required policy is to switch to
an aggressive money supply rule at some inflation rate between πL and π∗.
Such a policy would successfully avoid liquidity traps and deflationary paths.
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) reconsider the issues in a model
that allows for sticky prices and deviations of output from flexible-price lev-
els. They consider a representative-agent infinite-horizon dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model with (i) monopolistic competition (ii) price-
adjustment costs. Monetary policy follows a global Taylor-rule as above.
Fiscal policy is standard: exogenous government purchases gt and Ricardian
tax policy that depends on real debt level. The model is essentially a New
Keynesian model, except that, in line with Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe (2001), it has Rotemberg (1982) costs of price adjustment as the fric-
tion rather than Calvo pricing. The model equations are nonlinear, and the
nonlinearity in its analysis under learning is retained.
The key equations are
αγ
ν
(πt − 1)πt = β
αγ
ν
¡
πet+1 − 1
¢
πet+1
+(ct + gt)(1+ε)/α − α
µ
1− 1
ν
¶
(ct + gt)c−σ1t
ct = cet+1(π
e
t+1/βRt)
σ1,
The first equation is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, relating πt positively
to πet+1 and to measures of aggregate activity. The second equation is the
New Keynesian IS curve, obtained from the usual household Euler equation.
When linearized around a steady state, both of these equations are identical
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in form to the standard New Keynesian equations. There are also money
and debt evolution equations.
It is easily established that there are two stochastic steady states at πL
and πH . If the random shocks are iid then “steady-state” learning is appro-
priate for both ce and πe, i.e.
πet+1 = π
e
t + φt(πt−1 − πet)
cet+1 = c
e
t + φt(ct−1 − cet),
where φt is the gain sequence. The main findings are that while the intended
steady state at π∗ is locally stable under learning, the unintended steady
state at πL is unstable under learning. The key observation is that πL is a
saddlepoint, which implies the existence of deflationary spirals under learn-
ing. In particular, an expectational shock can lead to suﬃciently pessimistic
expectations, and ce, πe will follow paths leading to deflation and stagnation.
This is illustrated in Figure 7, based on E-stability dynamics.
•A
Figure 7: πe and ce dynamics under normal policy
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The intuition for the result can be seen by supposing that we are initially
near the πL steady state and considering a small drop in πe. With fixed
R this would lead through the IS curve to lower c and thus, through the
Phillips curve, to lower π. A suﬃcient reduction in R would be able to avoid
the reductions in c and π , but since we are close to the zero lower bound this
is not possible and the global Taylor rule here dictates only small reductions
in R. The falls in realized c and π then under learning leads to reductions in
ce and πe, and this sets in motion the deflationary spiral.
Thus, under normal policy the intended steady state is not globally stable
under learning. Large adverse shocks to expectations or structural changes
can set in motion unstable downward paths. Can policy be altered to avoid
deflationary spiral? Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) show that it can.
The recommended policy is to set a minimum inflation threshold π˜, where
πL < π˜ < π∗. For example, if the global Taylor rule is chosen so that πL
corresponds to deflation, then a convenient choice for the threshold would be
zero net inflation, i.e. π˜ = 1. The authorities would follow normal monetary
and fiscal policy provided this delivers πt > π˜. However, if πt threatens to fall
below π˜ under normal policy, then aggressive policies would be implemented
to ensure that πt = π˜: interest rates would be reduced, if necessary to near
the zero lower bound R = 1, and if this is not suﬃcient, then government
purchases gt would be increased as required.
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) show that these policies can indeed
ensure πt ≥ π˜ always under learning, and that incorporating aggressive mon-
etary and fiscal policies triggered by an inflation threshold π˜ leads to global
stability of the intended steady state at π∗. Perhaps surprisingly, it is also
shown that it is essential to use an inflation threshold. They show that using
instead an output threshold to trigger aggressive polices will not always avoid
deflationary spirals.
9 Conclusions
Expectations play a large role in modern macroeconomics. While the RE
assumption is the natural benchmark, it is implausibly demanding. Realis-
tically, it should be assumed that people are smart, but boundedly rational.
How should we model bounded rationality? We recommend the “principle of
cognitive consistency”: economic agents should be about as smart as (good)
economists. Since when economists need to make forecasts, they do so us-
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ing econometric models, a particularly natural choice is to model agents as
econometricians.
In many economic models, with an appropriate econometric perceived law
of motion, convergence to RE is possible. However, stability of REE under
private agent learning is not automatic. Our central message is that monetary
policy must be designed to ensure both determinacy and stability under
learning. This observation leads to particular choices of interest-rate rules,
whether we are considering standard classes of instrument rules or designing
optimal monetary policy. Instrument rules that respond appropriately to
“nowcasts” perform well in this respect, but implementing optimal policy
appears to require an appropriate response to private sector expectations
about the future.
More generally, policy-makers need to use policy to guide expectations,
and the recent literature provides several important illustrations. If under
learning there are persistent deviations from fully rational expectations, then
monetary policy may need to respond more aggressively to inflation in order
to stabilize expectations. The learning literature has also shown how to guide
the economy under extreme threats of either hyperinflation or deflationary
spirals. As we have illustrated, appropriate monetary and fiscal policy design
can minimize these risks.
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